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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Thinking like a climate
Hannah Knox*
Department of Anthropology, University College London, London, UK
This paper explores the ontological implications of global climate change as climate
science becomes grounds for politics. Prompted by parallels between what I call
‘climate thinking’ and recent philosophical work on the materiality of scientiﬁc
practice, the paper draws on the work of Karen Barad to explore the ontological
contours of scientiﬁc descriptions of anthropogenic climate change and the
implications of this ontology as it gets taken up in politics. The paper explores how
consensus around the reality of climate change has begun to shift the focus of climate
politics away from the issue of uncertainty towards the question of the appropriate
sites and agents of political action. Focusing on the relationship between the
materiality of climate change enacted by scientiﬁc descriptions of a changing climate
and the political responses these descriptions have provoked, the paper argues that
approaching climate as a political material is far from a retreat from a more humanist
version of politics. Rather, an attention to climate ontology in fact leads to the
observation that climate change is reintroducing political questions of agency, ethics,
and responsibility into domains where these questions have been until now bracketed
out as issues of social and not scientiﬁc concern.
Keywords: climate; objectivity; ontology; politics; responsibility; science; uncertainty
‘Climate change’ means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural
climate variability observed over comparable time periods. (United National Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Article 1)
In 2014, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its report on Impacts,
Adaptation and Vulnerability. On page 17 of the report, a remarkable claim was made: The
report stated, for the ﬁrst time in an IPCC document, ‘human interference with the climate is
occurring’ (IPCC 2014, 17; emphasis added). The certainty of this statement recalled for me
a conversation that I had had three years earlier during ethnographic research on climate
action and carbon reduction in Manchester. I had been discussing my academic interest
in the cultural politics of climate change with Richard Sharland, the then head of Manche-
ster City Council’s Environmental Strategy Team, and had suggested that the politics of
climate change hinged on the issue of uncertainty. Sharland had disagreed. Citing Al
Gore’s ﬁlm, An Inconvenient Truth, he stressed that the big political challenge for those
attempting to tackle climate change was not uncertainty but the inconvenience of the
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implications of scientiﬁc data that were ‘producing messages that we don’t want to hear’.
For Sharland, uncertainty was a distraction from the more important barriers to action on
climate change: a get-out, or excuse for inaction.
In 2011, Richard Sharland’s insight seemed to go against the grain of much that had
been written on the place of uncertainty in the political challenges of climate change
(Shackley and Wynne 1996; Saloranta 2001; O’Reilly et al. 2011; Yearly 1992).
However, since 2011 the politics of climate change has seen a continued shift from discus-
sions of uncertainty to the establishment of an ever more robust consensus on the facticity
of human-induced global warming (Edwards 2010). In 2001 the Third IPCC Working
Group I Assessment Report on climate change stated that the panel was only 66%
certain that climate change was induced by human activity. By 2013 and the publication
of the Fifth IPCC Working Group I Assessment Report, the level of certainty quoted in
the report had risen to 95%, provoking the subtle shift from a language of probability to
a language of fact.
Whilst the IPCC report alone is of course insufﬁcient to quieten the most vociferous of
climate sceptics, its conventionally conservative approach to assessing the ﬁndings of
climate science suggests that the move to re-articulate the role of humans in climate
change as fact rather than probability is indicative of a more pervasive acceptance that
human-induced climate change is ‘real’ (Brysse et al. 2013). Indeed during my own
ﬁeld-work amongst councillors and ofﬁcers working in the areas of health, waste, commu-
nity support, economic regeneration, and environment in a local authority in the North of
England, I spoke to no one who doubted the reality of climate change and its potential
harmful effects. As with the latest IPCC report, the matter of whether climate change
was happening, or not, was not the issue. In this shifting discourse, discussions about
what to do about climate change were no longer dominated by worries about the truth
status of scientiﬁc models, but had begun to focus instead on the implications of climate
as a new geo-social leviathan.
Although the transformation from probability to fact might appear trivial, I suggest that
it indicates an important moment in the way in which the relationship between the action of
humans and the action of their environments is being approached in governmental circles.
Taking human-induced climate change to have been endorsed as a scientiﬁc fact allows us
provisionally to set aside uncertainty as the focus of political wrangling, and to open up our
analysis of climate politics to consider the way in which climate-change-as-fact reframes
questions about the appropriateness of different kinds of action against climate change
and the sites where this action should take place. Until very recently, the ambiguous facti-
city of climate change remained a driving consideration in discussions of how governments
and individuals should respond to the threat of global warming (Schneider and Kuntz-Dur-
iseti 2002; Webster 2002; Hulme 2009). Deciding who should be responsible for doing
something about a problem whose causes were still unveriﬁed and whose reality was
thus in doubt was frequently deferred by appeals to science to provide the evidence that
current practices were harmful, and that counteraction would be effective in mitigating
the worst-case scenarios that some climate models were predicting. However, if the latest
IPCC report is to be taken as an indicator of a more general acceptance of the reality of
climate change in governmental discourse, our analytical attentions must also move from
the issue of how truths become established and/or contested, to the implications of the
ontology of the version of climate change we ﬁnd in governmental practice.
Focusing on climate-change-as-fact prompts an analytical move for those scholars inter-
ested in the political implications of climate change away from questions of epistemology
and struggles over the establishment of truth claims. It shifts the discussion away from
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questions regarding the veriﬁability of data and the appropriateness of particular methodo-
logical techniques for predicting the future, to consider how climate ‘itself’ is being acti-
vated as what we might call a ‘political material’. Speciﬁcally, it raises the question of
how an ontology of climate, as it becomes revealed through both predictive climate
models and the reformulation of social life through the lens of carbon emissions, is itself
working to frame debates about political action.
In what follows I draw both on my own ﬁeld-work with local government actors who
are attempting to create forms of social intervention that respond to the ﬁndings of climate
scientists, and on public discussions among climate scientists about their political respon-
sibilities as climate scientists to do something about climate change. Focusing on the way in
which a science-deﬁned version of climate change is being appealed to as a prompt for pol-
itical action, and on the ambivalences that this appeal is throwing up in these two spheres, I
interrogate how a changing climate is ﬁguring as what we might call a political material. In
order to shed light on how a scientiﬁc deﬁnition of climate change is unsettling some of the
boundaries between science and politics, I turn my attention to understanding the relational
ontology of climate change as it is described by policy-facing climate scientists. This leads
to the observation that the relational ontology of climate change bears some resemblance to
the ontological propositions of much post-constructivist philosophy of science, and in par-
ticular Karen Barad’s science-derived philosophy of ‘agentive realism’ which emerges out
of the challenges that quantum physics posed to the foundations of objective science (Barad
2007). Building on and extending Barad’s philosophy to demarcate the relational ontologi-
cal commitments of policy-oriented climate science, I explore how these relational prin-
ciples have come to inﬂect the forms of political intervention that are emerging as a
direct response to climate science. In this way I extrapolate some of the ways in which
climate change might be ﬁguring as a political material.
A politics of climate change
The empirical inspiration for this paper derives from an ethnographic study that I conducted
between 2011 and 2013 with a network of people in Manchester, UK, who were attempting
to develop institutional and governmental responses to the threat of global climate change.
The study involved my participation in and observation of a range of governmental and
quasi-governmental initiatives oriented towards an overall reduction of carbon emissions
for the city of Manchester. These included institution-speciﬁc projects to reduce the
carbon emissions of particular organizations, city-wide projects to insulate houses and
transform people’s energy use, and a multi-lateral project that aimed to transfer expertise
on carbon reduction between Manchester and other European cities.
One thing that was shared by the participants in all of these initiatives was the idea that
carbon reduction was a direct and logical response to the kind of climate science summar-
ized in the IPCC document above. None of the policy documents circulating in the city at
the time of my ﬁeld-work entered into any kind of discussion about the validity of climate
science, but took the status of scientiﬁc knowledge on climate change as established and
uncontroversial. The beginning of Manchester’s Climate Change Action plan, for
example, stated:
CO2 is a gas: the invisible image of expended carbon, and a spent natural resource.
CO2 currently consists of more than 380 parts per million of the earth’s atmosphere, and it is
rising. 350 parts per million is the optimum level for life as we know it, probably the best level
for people and all of nature to prosper.
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It is the responsibility of all of us to reduce CO2 emissions and spend our carbon more care-
fully. This document outlines the actions we need to take. (MACF 2009, 3)
One of the initiatives that was developed and launched during the time of my ﬁeld-work
was a programme of ‘carbon literacy’. Developed by a community interest company in
close collaboration with the local council, the Manchester carbon literacy programme
was designed as a method through which Manchester’s citizens could be inducted into
the science and governance of climate change and, accordingly, encouraged to change
their behaviour in a way that would begin to impact on global climate change.
The training in Carbon Literacy was offered initially to the employees of a number of
organizations, including ofﬁcers and councillors working within the city council itself. The
principle of the programme, as with other activities oriented to bringing about social and
behavioural change to reduce carbon emissions, was that people would be trained up to
become carbon literate and would then be able to impart their learning to colleagues
through a model of peer-to-peer learning. The Carbon Literacy programme proceeded
through a two-stage process, starting with a half-day online learning session, followed
by a face-to-face training session that was meant to reinforce the lessons learnt through
the online learning.
The content for the online learning section of the site had been developed in consul-
tation with climate scientists working at a local university who had provided information
on topics including: ‘how climate here and elsewhere is likely to change’, ‘what greenhouse
gases are and their relationship to weather and climate’, and ‘how our actions impact on
climate change’. Learners were taken through these topics and provided with graphics
such as a visual representation of what a tonne of carbon might look like, before being
encouraged to estimate their carbon footprint and to work out ways of reducing their
carbon impact in future.
During the face-to-face training sessions emphasis was placed on reinforcing the
message that people needed to begin to feel responsible for their own carbon emissions.
Although the idea was that those trained up in carbon literacy would go on to train other
people, the expectation was not that they would become experts in climate science but
rather that they would promote a particular understanding of how people should conceive
of their place within a global climate system. The sessions opened for example with a round
of ‘green bingo’. Designed as an ice-breaker, each person in the room was given a card
which had a bingo grid ﬁlled in with a set of environmentally friendly behaviours including:
‘cycles to work’, ‘is vegetarian’, ‘recycles’, ‘always turns off computer screen’. People then
had to circulate around the room, ﬁnding someone who did one of the activities on the grid,
gradually ﬁlling up the grid until one person won the game. In order to reinforce the idea
that carbon reduction was a necessary practice, various epistemological devices were used,
including the graphic representation of a tonne of carbon dioxide, the calculation of how
many worlds would be needed to sustain each person’s consumption activities, and the eco-
logical footprint for each participant which was compared with similar footprints for those
living in other parts of the world. The workshop was oriented to ensuring that people under-
stood precisely how the relationship between their daily practices and climate change
should be conceived, and how this conceptualization might provide the basis for making
practical choices about how and what they should consume.
Inculcating a sense of responsibility in citizens in both this project and others thus
involved attuning people to the basic science of climate change and as well as providing
them with ideas for how they might respond to a transformed interpretation of their own
place within a global climate system. The political work of reducing carbon emissions
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within these local authority initiatives rarely revolved around convincing hardened climate
sceptics that climate change was real. The struggle was rather one of how to encourage
people to recognize themselves as a constituent part of a global climate system, and to
alter their actions accordingly.
The local politics of climate change revolved then around instilling a particular sense of
human-environmental relationality amongst the general public. The aim of the carbon lit-
eracy programme was ambitious – every Manchester citizen was to be offered carbon lit-
eracy training by 2020. No longer was it to be acceptable for people to imagine
themselves to be divorced from broader systems dynamics that crossed not only commu-
nities and national borders, but also a line between nature and society. The role of govern-
ment in this setting was to ﬁnd ways of transforming people’s understanding of their place
in a global environmental system by encouraging them to think of themselves not just as
isolated individuals with personal needs and wants, but rather to conceive of themselves
as constituent parts of the climate system described by climate scientists.
The means by which this was to be achieved was, as we have seen, in the ﬁrst instance
by providing people with basic scientiﬁc facts. Resting very much within the logic of a
modernist form of scientiﬁc objectivity (Daston and Galison 1992), graphical depictions
of climate science used in these training sessions and in other public engagement events
offered a singularized picture of past global warming and future warming effects. The
analytical gaps between objective scientiﬁc images that projected a changing climate,
and the personal transformations that would be required by people to prevent this future
scenario from materializing were bridged by descriptions of how global climatic changes
were predicted to affect Manchester itself. Graphs showed gradually climbing carbon emis-
sions and projections of future temperature rises differentially distributed across the globe.
Again supported by evidence provided by research conducted in local universities, Man-
chester residents were informed that they could expect climate change to manifest in the
future in the form of increased ﬂooding, ‘extreme weather events’, rising insurance
costs, droughts affecting agriculture and infrastructure, and the knock-on socio-economic
effects of even more extreme climatic conditions in the tropics. At the same time, those
involved in instilling a mode of relationality that required publics to begin to ‘think like
a climate’ were concerned that the bridging of this epistemological gap between the
climate as object and climate as an aspect of people’s subjectivity was not currently effec-
tive. The on-going challenge was how to encourage people to internalize objective accounts
of climate in order that they could see themselves as part of the very dynamic that visual-
izations of predictive climate models were describing.
Given that the reality claims of climate science were so central to this political interven-
tion, it is perhaps unsurprising that an important means of legitimizing the redistributions of
responsibility required by climate change was through the direct involvement of spokespeo-
ple for climate science in political processes. In January 2013, Manchester climate scientist
Kevin Anderson was invited to a packed council chamber at Manchester City Council to
give a presentation to the elected councillors, ofﬁcers, and members of the public on the
latest predictions of climate science. Richard Leese, the leader of the council, had pre-
viously heard Anderson give a passionate presentation about the alarming picture that
was resolving out of climate scientists’ analyses of a changing global climate system
and, in what some saw as a brave move, had invited the scientist to address the council
directly. As with the carbon literacy programme’s use of climate science, Leese hoped
that Anderson’s presentation would both help educate councillors and ofﬁcers about the
dire implications of carbon emissions, and prompt discussion and ideas about how to
respond to these scientiﬁc ﬁndings.
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Anderson already had his own ideas about what should be done to reduce emissions and
who should be doing something about them. In a striking move that I had been pre-attuned
for by others who had already seen Anderson speak, he began his treatise on what to do
about climate change by turning the spotlight from the audience, onto himself, and then
back again casting everyone in the room as prime examples of the 1%–5% of the global
population responsible for 40%–50% of global carbon emissions. Asking the audience to
consider who is in the 1%–5% he ﬂashed up a PowerPoint slide that enacted his reﬂexive
engagement with the problem. The slide pointed to ‘climate scientists, climate journalists &
pontiﬁcators, OECD (& other) academics, anyone who gets on a plane, and for the UK
anyone earning over £30k?’ as those whom we might hold responsible for climate change.
In recent years Kevin Anderson and his colleague Alice Bows-Larkin have gained
something of a name for themselves both as climate scientists and as proponents of a
form of climate action that has emerged as a direct response to their scientiﬁc ﬁndings.
Their most idiosyncratic political act has perhaps been the decision to refuse to ﬂy on
the basis of their analysis of the contribution of aviation emissions to global warming.
As academics accustomed to being active on an international conference circuit, this
decision not to ﬂy has been publicly noted. During the UN Climate summit in Warsaw,
Poland, in 2013 Anderson and Bows-Larkin were interviewed by the independent news
channel Democracy Now! and were questioned about this decision not to ﬂy to the confer-
ence but to arrive there by train. In response Anderson explained,
I haven’t ﬂown for eight years and Alice for something similar I think, because of the carbon
dioxide emissions from ﬂying, it is sort of emblematic of modern life for the wealthy few of us
that it symbolizes what we do day-in, day-out, that we don’t think twice about burning more
and more carbon. So it is important for us to make what is a symbolic gesture and hopefully
that catalyses action with other people to also say, we too can make those sorts of changes.
Anderson’s personal response to climate change is an example of a kind of activism that
has come about through an acknowledgement that the climate as object of scientiﬁc enquiry
is complexly entangled with the actions of human beings, including climate scientists them-
selves. Although public understandings of climate change are only now coming to some
kind of agreement that human-induced climate change might be happening, this consensus
has been well established among climate scientists for some time (Oreskes 2004; Cook et al.
2013). As a result, among climate scientists the implications of their ﬁndings about human-
induced climate change have for several years been provoking controversial discussions
about just what role climate scientists themselves should play as political advocates for
climate change action. For some particularly vocal climate scientists, climate change has
come to reframe the role of scientists in society, propelling them as ‘unlikely activists’
(McKibben 2013), with a pressing responsibility for engaging the public in a ﬁght
against climate change. In trying to understand the ontological implications of the scientiﬁc
descriptions of climate change that appear in policy work, in what follows I focus speciﬁ-
cally on how the ontology of climate has been central to the forms of political intervention
developed and proposed by these ‘unlikely’ activist scientists.
The activist scientist
Anderson is just one of several scientists who have stood up as public advocates for revolu-
tionary political action on climate change. In a recent article in the New Statesman by the
political commentator Naomi Klein, provocatively entitled ‘How Science Is Telling Us All
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to Revolt’, Klein reviews this phenomenon of environmental scientists ﬁnding themselves
drawn into political action on the basis of their research results (Klein 2013). Anderson’s
political advocacy for action on global climate change is cited at length alongside others
including the well-known climate scientist/activist James Hansen, and the geophysicist
BradWerner who similarly argues for political revolution as a likely and necessary response
to the speedy and progressive depletion of the earth’s resources that his models have
revealed.
For each of these science-activists, the way in which they articulate their political acti-
vism is less through a commitment to particular ideological or political principles than via
the self-evidence of the data that they have been intimately involved with in the course of
their professional work. Moreover, what is particularly striking is the reﬂexive acknowl-
edgement that as people who inhabit the same social world as those who have produced
the data on global environmental change they are also directly implicated in the phenomena
that they are describing. Whilst scientists have long entered into political campaigning on
the basis of the ﬁndings of the research that they have conducted, their entanglement in the
worlds that they are describing and their responsibility to respond to this entanglement
through transformations in both their personal and political lives has not been the key
issue. For those scientists campaigning on issues such as the effects of nuclear weapons,
or tobacco, or acid rain, science has provided evidence that has shown the potentially
harmful effects of physical phenomena on human beings. However, the divide between
natural processes and social effects in these cases is not breached. In contrast, in climate
science, society itself is visible in climate data. The acknowledgement by climate scientists
of their own entanglement in the data that they have produced points to an interesting desta-
bilization in the kind of objectivity that climate science can claim for itself. In the case of
climate change, it has been in part the capacity to read the practices of climate science itself
(as one facet of the practices of the rich and privileged of the world) into the alarming
models that climate scientists have produced, that made it possible for climate data itself
to be a prompt for a form of political action aiming to re-engineer scientists’ own partici-
pation in social processes in the hope that they might be able to stabilize the numbers in
their models and calm the climate system in the future. Activist scientists like Anderson
and Bows-Larkin have found themselves having to reconceive political responsibility
through their attunement to a kind of systems (or climate) thinking that disavows a clear
separation between the observer and that which is being observed.
Perhaps unsurprisingly the call by some climate scientists to become politically active
has not been universally well received. In a discussion in The New York Times on the role
of climate scientists in climate activism for example, Susan Solomon, one of the scientists
involved in compiling the Fourth IPCC Report on Climate Change, argued against the
idea that climate scientists should be expected to dictate environmental policy: ‘I
believe that is a societal choice. I believe science is one input to that choice, and I also
believe that science can best serve society by refraining from going beyond its expertise.
In my view, that’s what the I.P.C.C. also is all about, namely not trying to make policy-
prescriptive statements, but policy-relevant statements’ (Revkin 2007). This kind of pos-
ition that reinforces the distinction between science and society is well documented within
studies of the relationship between science and policy-making (Jasanoff 1990, 1996).
Research in the social studies of science has demonstrated the important role that such
‘boundary work’ plays in maintaining the legitimacy of science by enacting its separation
from non- or pseudo-science on the one hand, and society on the other (Shackley and
Wynne 1996; Guston 2001). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that most climate scientists
seem to concur with Solomon that the best means by which they can make a difference to
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policy is by remaining within the boundaries of legitimated scientiﬁc knowledge
production.
However, the particular form of climate activism taken by political spokespersons for
science such as Anderson and Bows-Larkin still bears thinking about if we are to under-
stand better the relationship between a consensus view of climate change and the ground
for contemporary forms of political action. As we have seen, for activist scientists this
centres on a form of personal and professional responsibility that emerges out of a scientiﬁc
understanding of the relationship between people and climate. The notion that climate
scientists should be at the vanguard of climate change politics because of their simultaneous
proximity to the science and their status as citizens of a global-environmental system offers
a powerful counter-argument to a position that works to reinforce the sanctity of the scien-
tist as standing outside society. In contrast to those who enact the boundary work which
holds up the neutrality of science, some policy-facing climate scientists and climate obser-
vers have begun to argue that such boundaries are fallacious and that a neutral position is no
longer possible. The ﬁnancier Jeremy Grantham, for example, recently argued in the journal
Nature that ‘Overstatement may generally be dangerous in science (it certainly is for
careers) but for climate change, uniquely, understatement is even riskier and therefore, argu-
ably, unethical’ (Gratham 2012, 303). Kevin Anderson has proposed a similar argument,
positioning himself against the kind of argument proposed by Susan Solomon. Far from
seeing his own work as singularly political, Anderson argues that all climate science is
necessarily political. For Anderson, the act of staying silent is just as – if not more – political
than speaking up. With this in mind, he has described his own experience of the lack of
engagement by most climate scientists as a case of being ‘deafened by the political roar
of most scientists who work on climate change’. He goes on:
So we may think we’re doing this neutrally, but we’re not at all. That silence is an advocacy for
the status quo. So there are no such things as scientists that are not political. Scientists by their
nature are being political, whether they engage or do not engage in the wider debates. And I
would argue that the ones are who are the least political are the ones who engage in it. (Man-
chester Climate Monthly 2013)
So what exactly is the nature of this political entanglement?
To return to Anderson’s reﬂexive observation that climate scientists are themselves not
only responsible for publicizing their ﬁndings but are also partly responsible for climate
change itself, the question of action as it relates to climate science appears to be tied not
only to questions of advocacy but also to a broader question of personal responsibility
that is raised by the reconceptualization of climate as a natural/social system. At the crux
of this debate about whether climate scientists should or should not be political is the ques-
tion of the relationship between scientiﬁc practice, data, and political action, and the per-
sonal responsibility of scientists to act on ﬁndings that reﬂect back on them as social
actors. Ambivalence about doing politics on the basis of data retains the objectivity of
scientists as actors who are situated outside the system that their models and experiments
describe. But, for those scientists who are advocating action on climate change, the key
issue is an acknowledgement that science is already entangled in the systems which are pro-
ducing the effects being studied and that even inaction is already action of a kind.
From where, then, do they see this sense of political responsibility to derive? As with
the carbon literacy example with which I started, the claim appears to be that it comes
directly from an engagement with climate models, whereby scientists and others who are
shown these models are invited to see their own activities and choices captured in the
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curves of rising temperatures and the maps of climate hotspots. In a manner not dissimilar to
the social affordances of rivers and forests described in Alberto Kohn’s recent book How
Forests Think, human-induced climate change manifests itself in graphical depictions
which structure the possibilities of a political response (Kohn 2013). Kohn describes
how the formal qualities of rivers and forests in the area of the Amazon where he does
ﬁeld-work have an important and often overlooked capacity to provide the conditions of
possibility for particular forms of life, meaning, and action to occur. For Kohn the ontology
or particular form of the forest must be recognized as a key factor in the formation of both
indigenous and post-colonial practices of relationality in this space. Similarly, we might
argue that a scientiﬁc rendering of climate and the incorporation of this rendering into
policy also has a powerful organizing effect. If the climate is objectively spiralling out of
control, and we are factually facets of that spiralling process, then surely it is we who
should try to change our way of acting in order to bring it back under control. It is to
index the experience of a relationship between ontology and action that I have titled this
paper ‘Thinking Like a Climate’.
The trigger for political advocacy amongst climate scientists, then, is not political phil-
osophy, but rather a particular understanding of the relational dynamics of the human-
natural climate system. As Klein puts it, changing the political system is ‘no longer a
matter of mere ideological preference but rather one of species-wide existential necessity’
(Klein 2013). In this respect climate change action seems a clear example of what Swyn-
gedouw has termed a ‘post-political’ form of contemporary action, where politics is
based not on a social vision of an idealized future, but on apocalyptic eco-imaginaries
that promise to be resolved via ‘complex managerial and institutional conﬁgurations’
(Swyngedouw 2010, 222). As Swyngedouw points out, ‘in the climate change debate,
the political nature of matters of concern is disavowed to the extent that the facts in them-
selves are elevated, through a short-circuiting procedure, on to the terrain of the political,
where climate change is framed as a global humanitarian cause’ (Swyngedouw 2010,
217). Nonetheless, the facts of a policy-oriented climate science are no longer the sacro-
sanct facts of a version of science that is able to keep nature separate from society. Here
political action is framed by a certain understanding of material relationships of which
human actions become enfolded as an important constituent part. Climate change thus
offers, I suggest, an example of what Marisol de la Cadena (2010) and Mario Blaser
(2010) have called ‘ontological politics’. However, it is an ontological politics in which
the ontology at its centre is not the relational vibrancy of earth beings or the relational emer-
gence of indigenous pluriverses but the circulating qualities of a complex and dynamic
climate system. It is to the ontological politics of a version of ‘the climate’ that is being
responded to in policy circles that I now turn.
An ontology of climate
It is striking that in philosopher of science Karen Barad’s recent book,Meeting the Universe
Halfway, Barad begins her discussion of the ontological commitments of quantum physics
with an account of the anxiety surrounding the extent to which the work of physicists Niels
Bohr and Werner Heisenberg may have been implicated in the development of nuclear
weapons during the second world war. Meeting the Universe Halfway turns out,
however, to be less of a discussion of the ethics of scientiﬁc knowledge production and
its impact on global politics, than a philosophical discussion of the opportunities that an
analysis of quantum physics might hold for a reinvigorated philosophy of science that
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acknowledges the relationship between multiple forms of human and non-human agency as
a basic ontological commitment.
Barad is particularly concerned with the way in which quantum physics posed a chal-
lenge to Newtonian science, leading physicist Niels Bohr to develop a theory that was able
to acknowledge what Barad calls the ‘intra-action’ of observer and observed. The emer-
gence of quantum mechanics was a fascinating moment for science, for it disrupted the
basis upon which scientists had been able to claim objectivity in their work by proposing
that the properties of the natural world being measured were destabilized or ‘diffracted’
by the very act of measurement.1 Perhaps interestingly for our analysis here, Barad’s analy-
sis hinges on a differentiation between Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, that focused on
the undecidability of two variables (e.g. position and momentum), and Bohr’s concern with
complementarity. If Heisenberg was preoccupied with the inherent unknowability of both
the position and the momentum of a particle at any moment in time, Bohr argued that it
was impossible for a particle to have both position and momentum at the same time, and
that it was the presence or absence of particular measurement equipment that determined
whether the particle would manifest in terms of either momentum or position (i.e. the vari-
ables of momentum and position were complementary to one another) (Barad 2007, 22). If
Heisenberg and Bohr differed in their interpretation of the paradoxical observations that led
to quantum theories, the effect of the paradox that observation seemed to change what was
being observed was that, for both, the experiment could no longer be claimed to exist apart
from the experimental subject. Now, in quantum physics, the presence of the experimental
apparatus and the scientiﬁc subject had to be incorporated as an active component of the
dynamic system that the scientist was aiming to observe.
With her attention to the ways in which quantum physics found itself needing to dis-
mantle the separation between observer and observed, Barad derives a theoretical perspec-
tive that I suggest is helpful for assessing the epistemological and political implications of
climate change. Barad’s theory of intra-activity, which she derives from her analysis of
quantum physics, allows us to explore whether, in the cases I have described, a similar
recursive relationship between the models and the realities which they attempt to model
is also at play, and if so what the particular relational commitments, and thus politics, of
this recursivity might be.
The incorporation of the effects of almost all human practices into that which is being
measured by climate science comes only after years of analysis in which the science of
climate change proceeded for the main part within the conﬁnes of ‘normal’ science
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). The emergence of climate science is a dual story whereby
the analysis of the circulating systems of weather has sat alongside a parallel and at
times intersecting analysis of the effects of the radiative properties of carbon dioxide as a
determinant of climatic variation. Science-inspired suggestions of local anthropogenic
climate change go back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century, but it was at the turn of
the twentieth century that a potential link was ﬁrst established between the levels of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and global climate change. In the early nineteenth
century Joseph Fourier identiﬁed the warming effect of the earth’s atmosphere, arguing
that the atmosphere absorbs radiant heat (Edwards 2010; Weart 2008) and terming this
for the ﬁrst time a ‘serre’ or ‘greenhouse’ effect. In the 1850s, this suggestion was explored
in more detail by chemist John Tyndall who analysed the different radiative potentials of
various gases found in the atmosphere in order better to understand how this greenhouse
effect worked. But it was Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish scientist, who identiﬁed an inter-
action between the heat-retaining effects of CO2 and water vapour and ﬁrst made the ten-
tative suggestion that the human extraction of fossil fuels might one day contribute to global
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warming. In an 1896 academic paper, Arrhenius calculated ‘that doubling the amount of
CO2 in the atmosphere would raise the global average temperature by 5–6 degrees’
(Edwards 2010, 73). Arrhenius thought that the potential existed for humans to exacerbate
this process by burning fossil fuels, but predicted it would be several thousand years before
human activities would be able actually to affect global temperatures.
The idea that carbon dioxide could be a key factor in determining global temperature
changes was initially contested and, despite initial interest in the work of Arrhenius and
the US climate scientist Thomas Chamberlain who further demonstrated Arrhenius’s
theory, the theory that CO2 could be held responsible for either global warming or
cooling was broadly discredited. It was not until the 1930s that the British steam engineer
Guy Stewart Callendar revived the theory and with it reiterated the possibility that human
activity itself might be capable of effecting global changes in temperature.
Although the idea that human activities might conceivably have been responsible for
the changes in CO2 levels that were being detected, the scientiﬁc method through which
this information was discerned was working very much within the kind of modernist objec-
tivist scientiﬁc paradigm that has been written about extensively by scholars of the history
of science (Daston and Galison 2010; Shapin and Shaffer 1985). This was only to shift as
the method for analysing climate moved gradually from the collation of information across
different disciplinary subﬁelds, to the incorporation of different kinds of data into complex
climate models which were able not only to describe the climate system in terms of a
dynamic interaction of physical properties, but could begin to provide both retro-analysis
of an earlier science of climate and predictions of future trajectories under different
scenarios.
In his 2010 book, A Vast Machine, Paul Edwards recounts how the establishment of a
scientiﬁc consensus around the link between these climate and carbon phenomena emerged
under great scepticism and only it became possible to demonstrate this link effectively with
the invention of computer modelling which was for the ﬁrst time able to analyse the feed-
back loops of heat radiation in complex circulations of air in the global atmospheric system.
Edwards also suggests that an increased attention to the measurement of carbon was
prompted by analyses of levels of the radioactive isotope carbon-14 as a method of measur-
ing the effects of the fall-out of nuclear testing in the mid-twentieth century, a project which
led to the establishment of stations to measure atmospheric levels of carbon at Mauna Loa
in Hawaii and also in Antarctica (Edwards 2010; Lövbrand and Stripple 2011; Weart 2008).
Research on the decay of carbon-14 also opened the way for analyses of the different kinds
of carbon that were to be found in the atmosphere, allowing scientists to determine by the
1960s that a signiﬁcant proportion of atmospheric carbon dioxide was derived directly from
the burning of fossil fuels (Weart 2008). It was the emergent effect of these coincidental
scientiﬁc advances taking place in often otherwise unconnected ﬁelds – oceanography,
meteorology, engineering, and computer science – that provided the grounds upon which
an increasingly robust argument that human activities were indeed changing the global
climate could begin to be established.
As the 1980s saw the establishment of an ever more robust consensus among climate
scientists, one effect of this consensus was to open up to climate science the possibility
of its possible complicity, as part of the activity of modern industrialized economies, in
the production of the system that it was detecting and the future direction of the system
that its models predicted. Whilst this remains admittedly a marginal concern within main-
stream climate science, the tension between the climate as an objective entity and the
climate as dynamically constituted by human environmental interactions is a problematic
which proliferates within attempts to use climate science as justiﬁcation for policies for
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social and environmental change. Two further examples from my own ﬁeld-work illustrate
the issue whereby the social practices through which objective description and forms of
intervention are developed, becoming recognized as part of the problem that they are
trying to describe. The ﬁrst was a repeated observation that was made in a project that
was hoping to develop a technological answer to climate change through the promotion
of digital technologies that would reduce travel and provide information to help people
make more ecologically friendly decisions. Here discussions frequently revolved around
the question of whether digital technologies might actually be a major cause of climate
change with a correlation between increases in IT use since the 1980s and global increases
in carbon emissions perhaps pointing to a more fundamental inseparability of problem and
solution. Similarly, conversations about how to produce future low-carbon cities often
circled around a tension between proposals to increase the density of cities in order to
reduce transport costs and thus reduce carbon emissions in order to mitigate climate
change, and questions over whether the building work itself would end up producing
more carbon emissions than would be offset by a projected reduction in car journeys. In
each of these cases where climate science was used as justiﬁcation for social intervention,
the objectivity of the science was tripped up by the realization that any potential solution
would have to be analytically reincorporated as part of the object that it was meant to
resolve. Whilst Bohr was shocked to ﬁnd, in his experiments with light particles, traces
of the presence of the scientiﬁc observer, those using science as the grounds for policy
were frequently unsettled by a realization of the entanglement of the means of tackling
of climate change and the nature of the object which this analytical or practical was
working to transform.
To return to Barad’s discussion of quantum physics, Barad builds on Bohr’s recognition
of the role of the experimental apparatus and scientiﬁc observer in changing the nature of
the reality being measured, in order to propose an ontological philosophy which she terms
‘agential realism’. From her analysis of Bohr’s quantum physics, Barad aims to develop a
new ontological foundation for the philosophy of science. In many ways the description that
Barad arrives at is consistent with other work in Science and Technology Studies that has
focused on the materiality of scientiﬁc practice and the entanglement of the human and the
non-human in the production of scientiﬁc knowledge (Latour andWoolgar 1979; Mol 2003;
Stengers 2010). However, her commitment to the development of a philosophy derived
from quantum physics itself leads her to place a greater emphasis on what she calls the
intra-agentive properties of humans and non-humans within experimental systems and
the development of a more singular and realist description of the world than other
studies in the social construction of science have produced. For Barad, agential realism
is a philosophical approach that not only tries to describe the role of non-humans in
social processes, but also aims to account for the realization that ‘we are part of the
nature we seek to understand’ (Barad 2007, 26).
In drawing attention to an ontological understanding that allows for the entanglement of
humans and non-humans in the production of science, Barad’s work provides us with some
helpful resources with which to understand the ontological contradictions that contempor-
ary climate science appears to have brought to the fore in policy work, though it does so
more as a sympathetic or parallel description to that which I am providing here, rather
than a theory to be applied to explain the relationship between science and politics.
The understanding of the global climate that has emerged out of the analytical work
conducted by the history of climate science described above, and which is now institutio-
nalized in climate models, hinges on a recognition that the object of analysis is in a process
of constant mutation and change and, signiﬁcantly, that the actions that are contributing to
102 H. Knox
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 07
:31
 16
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
15
 
these changes are distributed and multi-faceted. One challenge in climate modelling is how
to gather sufﬁcient and appropriate data so that climate models accurately mirror the
complex dynamic system which they themselves have revealed the climate to be. If
Barad claims for agential realism that ‘matter is a dynamic and shifting entanglement of
relations, rather than a property of things’ (Barad 2007, 35), the version of climate
science which has appeared in policy circles has also emphasized the relational and sys-
temic nature of the global climate in a way that pushes modellers to account not only for
geophysical processes but also their link with geopolitical and economic formations. As
demonstrated by the quote from the IPCC with which this article opens, the climate is con-
ceived by climate science as a dynamic system. The climate is not primarily a thing but a set
of relationships. In anthropogenic climate change humans have been incorporated into this
relational scheme, becoming reconceived not as outside but as part of the nature that climate
science seems to describe, raising the issue for those who use science as the basis of political
activism of how to address their own latent presence within the models that they are
working upon. Whilst not identical, I suggest this problem is not dissimilar to Bohr’s
need to account for the role of context in the production of different experimental realities.
As Barad puts it, ‘Agential realism is not about representations of an independent reality but
about the real consequences, interventions, creative possibilities and responsibilities of
intra-acting within and as part of the world’ (Barad 2007, 37).
Because of her avid commitment to the rigours of Bohr’s scientiﬁc method and the onto-
logical conundrums that this method has provoked, Barad’s work provides a language that
helps to shed light on the systemic, dynamic, and intra-active characteristics of the ontologi-
cal relationships put on the table when climate science becomes oriented to political ends.
Her commitment to taking seriously the ﬁndings of a quantum physics that shares with a
science-inspired ontology of climate an opening up to new dimensions of relationality,
which both extends and disrupts this science, leads her philosophy to mirror the requirement
for climate scientists, policy activists, and climate publics to acknowledge their ‘intra-
activity’ with the world they are simultaneously observing. Moreover, the desire that
Barad exhibits to develop an explicitly political philosophy on the basis of her understand-
ing of quantum physics also suggests some parallels with the ambitions of those who are
attempting to intervene in the governance of climate change that we are concerned with
here. Like Barad, those who are negotiating the relationship between science and political
action are concerned with the question of how to mobilize an understanding of human
beings’ intra-active participation in natural processes to bring about forms of social
change. Nonetheless, reading climate governance through Barad’s agential realism only
gets us so far. Further attention to the speciﬁc worries of those who are trying to tackle
science-deﬁned climate change suggests some key differences between Barad’s agential
realism and the ontology of climate within which these governmental actors and subjects
are working.
Agents, systems, and momentum
In coining the neologism ‘intra-action’, Barad makes a move against the idea of ‘inter-
action’ which would point to the interplay between two well-deﬁned entities. In contrast,
intra-action points to the way in which the relation itself is constitutive of those things
being related. As we have seen, this approach allows us to appreciate that phenomena
are not ‘merely the result of laboratory experiments engineered by human subjects’
(Barad 2003, 816). Rather phenomena are the co-becoming of human and non-human
actions, including matter, apparatuses, and practices, in which distinctions like those
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between human and non-human themselves emerge. Recasting phenomena in this way,
Barad makes a move to reconceive the world as ‘agential intra-activity in its becoming’
(Barad 2003, 816). For Barad an important effect of an attention to intra-activity is that
it acknowledges the indeterminacy of the world. The consequence of this approach is
that Barad places great emphasis on the capacity of intra-agentivity to produce radically
open futures. She argues: ‘The future is not what will come to be in an unfolding of the
present moment; rather the past and the future are enfolded participants in matter’s iterative
becoming’ (2003, 816). It is here that I suggest her philosophy begins to deviate from the
particular ontology of a governable climate with which we are concerned here.
If the climate is conceived by those attempting to create political solutions to climate
change as an intra-active system, it is certainly not understood as a system in which ‘the
future is radically open at every turn’ (Barad 2003, 826). In fact, the requirement that acti-
vist climate scientists and the technicians of carbon mitigation feel to enact their own agen-
tive interventions into the climate system is derived not from a sense of the openness of the
system, but with a dread that the future is worryingly over-determined, and a fear that
human action risks being ineffective in a system which is already exhibiting a powerful
momentum in an apocalyptic direction.
One of the central tenets of Kevin Anderson’s analysis of climate mitigation possibili-
ties, for example, is the notion of the ‘carbon budget’. This is the idea that the global climate
system is affected not by daily, monthly, or yearly emissions rates but by the cumulative
amount of carbon in the atmosphere. ‘For long-lived gases such as CO2 and many other
greenhouse gases, cumulative emissions, the stock that builds up in the atmosphere, is
the quantity that matters. Every day we turn the lights on, every time we drive a car we
add to the accumulating stock of atmospheric CO2. Our cumulative emissions – and our
carbon budget – are pivotal to understanding temperature and climate change’ (Anderson
2012, 21).
Manchester’s carbon literacy project also builds explicitly on this idea of the carbon
budget in order to try to stress to people the urgency of the need to act. For Anderson
and other technicians of carbon mitigation, the fear is that this carbon budget is rapidly
being used up. Although still tentatively optimistic about the capacity of humans to curb
a trajectory towards disaster, the longer that the reduction of carbon emissions is
delayed, the more dire the predictions become, and the less capacity humans will
have to intervene in a climate system out of (human) control. The ontological impli-
cation of attending to cumulative emissions rather than emission rates is an acknowledg-
ment that although the climate is produced through intra-actions, its effects are systemic
and identiﬁable, allowing it to operate as a kind of hyper-object (Morton 2013) with a
superagency all of its own. If a science-inspired ontology of climate change puts new
forms of relationality in play, it does so by simultaneously reinscribing the singularity
of the system. Society bleeds into nature, but it does so in such a way as to produce
a new nature/culture whose singularity is key to the framing of political interventions
as a matter of changing behaviours and/or introducing technological solutions.
Climate models which predict the future direction of climatic variations under different
cumulative emission scenarios have produced alarming results which have been var-
iously described in terms of runaway climate change, of tipping points, and of points
of no return (Pearce 2007; Stern 2008, 6). As James Hansen explains in an interview
in The New York Times, ‘if we burn even a substantial fraction of the fossil fuels, we
guarantee there’s going to be unstoppable changes. We’re going to leave a situation
for young people and future generations that they may have no way to deal with’
(Gillis 2013).
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For policy-oriented climate science then, the systemic interactions that climate science
has come to model have a temporal element that demonstrates not just that climates are pro-
duced out of a process of systemic intra-action, but that the space and time within which
humans will be able to retain a particular, desired intra-active role in the climatological
process is closing down. The idea of momentum captured in the concept of ‘runaway
climate change’ points to a scenario that could have been otherwise but is increasingly
likely to come to be. Whilst Barad thus holds agency up as central to a new ontological
model, in thinking like a climate we ﬁnd not just that phenomena have the capacity to differ-
entiate objects in the process of their becoming but that they also work to differentiate the
form that agency itself might take. If the particular climate ontology that we are concerned
with here shares with Barad an acknowledgement of intra-active becoming, this same
climate thinking also complicates the philosophy of agential realism by putting into ques-
tion the very nature of agency itself. Where Barad claims that ‘particular possibilities for
acting exist at every moment, and these changing possibilities entail a responsibility to
intervene in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is excluded
from mattering’ (Barad 2003, 827), climate scientists like James Hansen remind us that ‘the
important point is that we have started a process that is out of humanity’s control’,2 while
Kevin Anderson concludes in an attempt to hold on to agency: ‘there is real hope, but that
hope reduces signiﬁcantly each day’ (Anderson 2012, 39). Thinking-like-a-climate requires
an acknowledgement not only of the intra-agentive effects of subjects and objects, then, but
of the overarching agency of the system-as-a-whole.
The ambivalence towards the capacity of individual human agency to respond to an
anthropogenically driven climate system that is overwhelming in its own momentum has
important implications for how we might think about the politics of climate change and
its relationship to climate science. As discussed in the introduction to this special issue,
attention to materiality as a site of politics can at times seem to displace or de-centre
human agency in favour of an attention to the affordances and structuring effects of
materials themselves. However, a focus on the ontology of climate change seems to demon-
strate that climate change is not so much a set of material relations which have political
effects by reorganizing people and things in dynamic reconﬁgurations. Rather, the
version of climate change that we ﬁnd invoked in the mundane technopolitics of carbon
reduction provokes a realm of political action which re-poses the question of the relation-
ship between the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of politics.
Far from an attention to the ontology of climate science having the effect of displacing
the agency of humans by attending instead to the political agency of things, in the attempts
at climate change mitigation that we have considered here it is precisely the particular ontol-
ogy of climate as systemic interconnection that establishes an imperative that climate scien-
tists and other citizens alike must acknowledge their agency, albeit at the moment at which
the possibility of that agency making a political difference seems about to disappear. If the
‘science wars’ were concerned with the risk that an attention to sociality might pollute the
objectivity of science, it is now, ironically, the materiality of climate reconceived as an
anthropogenic problem, and its particular ontological characteristics seemingly revealed
by contemporary climate science, that is bringing the makers of objectivist science back
into the picture as newly reconceived ‘political’ actors whose political responsibility is
deﬁned not by ideology but by a privileged understanding of their (and thus of all of
our) participation in reproducing a system of global environmental change.
Although the reduction of responsibility from the collective to the personal register is
often seen as an anti-political move, as we have seen here there is an intimate and important
relationship between the claims to need to take personal responsibility for climate change
Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 105
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 07
:31
 16
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
15
 
and the exhortation that society must act collectively to mitigate this transformation. Here
the attempts by activists to lead by example by changing their own practices is meant as a
performance of their commitment to a form of political intervention that takes its lead from
scientiﬁc data on material processes. As the scientiﬁc evidence has become more robust, the
calls of scientists like James Hansen and Kevin Anderson have at the same time become
ever more radical and vociferous. Hansen, who retired in 2013 eventually ﬁnding his pos-
ition as climate activist untenable within the institutional structures of NASA, now dedi-
cates himself full time to the cause of environmental activism.3 Meanwhile, Kevin
Anderson’s calls for social and political transformation have also become increasingly revo-
lutionary. Recently feted by anti-globalization activist Naomi Klein (Klein 2013), Anderson
couples his academic work with speeches to political bodies about the necessity for deep
and sweeping social and political change to tame and slow the ravages of a changing
climate.
Perhaps then, the politics provoked by large-scale environmental processes is not as
‘post-political’ as Swyngedouw suggests (Swyngedouw 2010). If the distracting issue of
whether anthropogenic climate change is real is gradually being displaced by a consensus
that human-induced climate change is happening, then we are entering a moment in which
the ontology of climate as established in the interstices of science and policy might become
a prompt for a reinvigorated set of arguments about who or what might be the appropriate
sites, agents, and custodians of politics. This is not to say that the ontology of climate
described here is politically deterministic or indeed emancipatory. But it is to recognize
that the politics of climate change is one where questions of responsibility, ethics, and pol-
itical action can no longer be simply bracketed out as a domain separate from the production
of scientiﬁc fact (Latour 2004). If we are to critique the politics, we must attend simul-
taneously to the ontological commitments of climate science out of which particular politi-
cal possibilities resolve. What the effects of this ontologization of politics will be for
emergent forms of political intervention itself remains to be seen.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to explore the ontological status of climate as it becomes con-
ceived as an object of climate change governance and the implications of this practical
ontology for our understanding of a contemporary relationship between science and poli-
tics. In paying attention to the principles of climate as promoted by those who use
climate science as the grounds for political intervention, I have proposed an explanation
for the emergence of a particular kind of ontological politics which is reorganizing the con-
ceptual parameters of the roles and responsibilities of objectivist scientists, political acti-
vists, and climate publics. Ontological politics in this register is a politics where climate
change, revealed through predictive climate models that incorporate historical data from
different disciplinary sources, provides the grounds for particular kinds of political
action. Karen Barad’s work has been particularly helpful for investigating this ontology
of climate and its implications for a contemporary politics of climate mitigation.
By paying attention to the speciﬁc understandings of climate change that cast it as an
extended material process that, whilst incorporating new realms of activity, re-establishes
itself as a model of a singular reality (Law, this issue), I have demonstrated how this par-
ticular ontology of climate has had the effect of opening science up to politics in new
ways. Far from displacing the role of the person in the production of the climate as an
object of intervention, an attention to the political exhortations that arise from conceiving
of climate as a systemic material process is shown to have begun to return science to
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politics, albeit at a moment when the possibilities of mobilizing human agencies against
previously unforeseen environmental effects appear to be receding.
Latour and Woolgar’s original ground-breaking analysis of scientiﬁc practice aimed to
elucidate the production of scientiﬁc facts in a manner that mirrored scientiﬁc practice in its
requirement to bracket out a classically sociological version of the human scientist from its
description of processes of scientiﬁc knowledge production (Latour and Woolgar 1979). At
pains to show that science was best explained not through recourse to descriptions of cul-
tural beliefs or value systems, but through a minute attention to the relational enactments
that scientists participated in as they mobilized scientiﬁc apparatus, experimental equip-
ment, and rules and modes of communication, Latour and Woolgar made a choice not to
dwell on the usual sociological categories of personality, biography, and identity in their
description of scientiﬁc knowledge production. And yet now, even Latour himself has
acknowledged the effects of climate change on the status of the scientist as agent:
‘While the older problem of science studies was to understand the active role of scientists
in the construction of facts, a new problem arises: how to understand the active role of
human agency not only in the construction of facts, but also in the very existence of the
phenomena those facts are trying to document?’ (Latour 2014, 2).
With climate science, we ﬁnd that the stability of scientiﬁc representation, whose con-
struction Latour himself revealed so carefully, is being challenged through a material poli-
tics in which the agency, morality, and effects of the scientist and his or her society must be
read into the scientiﬁc models themselves and responded to accordingly. I have argued that
it is helpful to conceive of climate as a political material not because it replaces human poli-
tics with a politics of matter (Bennett 2010; Braun and Whatmore 2010) but because of the
way in which it no longer allows for materiality to stand apart from sociality and, in doing
so, opens the door once again for politics to re-enter the domain of objective description
where it has, for most of modernity, been bracketed out.
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Notes
1. For histories of scientiﬁc objectivity see Daston and Galison (1992; 2010) and Shapin and Schaf-
fer (1985).
2. Quote from James Hansens TED (Techology, Entertainment, Design) talk “Why I must speak out
about Climate Change”. Feb 2012, available at: http://www.ted.com/talks/james_hansen_why_i_
must_speak_out_about_climate_change?language=en. Last Accessed 19.3.2015.
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3. As reported in The New York Times and The Guardian newspapers: http://www.theguardian.
com/science/political-science/2013/apr/02/james-hansen-retires-science-politics, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/04/02/science/james-e-hansen-retiring-from-nasa-to-ﬁght-global-warming.
html?_r=0.
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